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中文摘要：
低碳经济环境下,下游零售商宣传上游制造商的减排行为以获得更好的市场绩效,是供应链管理实践中常见的合作形式.文章假设消费者需求受产品减排量和零售商低碳宣传的影响,在考虑到产品减排量受制造商减排努力影响且在多周期连续生产时具有动态变化特征的情况下,构建了零售商和制造商的3种微分博弈模型.研究发现,在一定条件下,成本分担契约可以实现制造商、零售商和整个供应链系统利润的Pareto改善;当制造商的边际收益足够大时,成本分担契约对制造商利润的Pareto改善效果越明显,制造商越有动力利用成本分担契约激励零售商进行低碳宣传.这将为供应链上下游制定合作策略及供应链低碳化的管理实践提供一定的参考价值.最后,通过算例对模型进行了分析.
英文摘要：
In the contextoflow-carbon economics,better market performance is usually achieved through the retailer＇s promotion on the manufacturer＇s emission reductions,which is a common cooperation manner in practical supply chain management. Assuming that demands were affected by the emission reduction of the product and the retailer＇s promotion,three Differential Game Models were established,which was also based on the fact that the emission reduction of the product is affected by the efforts of the manufacturer to reduce emissions and it possesses dynamic features in multiple cycles. It was found that under the cost-sharing contract profits can achieve Pareto improvement for the manufacturer,retailer and the supply chain system under certain conditions; when the manufacturer＇s marginal revenue is large enough,the improvement in profit for the manufacturer is more significant,and they would like to use the cost-sharing contract to inspire the retailer.Some valuable information could be provided for supply chain enterprises to develop collaborative strategies and to promote low-carbon supply chain management practice. Finally,the model was analyzed through an example.
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