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中文摘要：
通过供应商回购担保,可以激励厌恶风险的银行提高对资金约束零售商的贷款限额,增加零售商的购买力,提高供应链整体绩效.在银行下侧风险控制和供应商回购担保下,研究了零售商的最优运作和融资策略,分析了银行厌恶风险的程度、供应商的回购价格对供应链决策的影响.研究发现,银行采用下侧风险控制等价于银行通过贷款上限控制融资风险,且供应商承诺的回购价格越高,银行贷款限额就越高.存在回购价格的临界值,使得只有当供应商的回购价格低于该临界值时,零售商的订货才会受银行风险控制的影响.并且,通过数值分析研究了供应商的最优回购定价问题.
英文摘要：
Suppliers＇ buy-back guarantee can prompt the risk-averse bank to boost the loan limit to capitalconstrained retailers, which can enhance the purchasing power of retailers and increase the performance of supply chain. The optimal operational and financing strategies of retailers were studied, and the impact of the risk averse degree of the bank and the buy-back price of the supplier on the decisions of the supply chain were analyzed under the downside risk control of the hank and the buy-back guarantee of the suppli- er. It is shown that the downside risk control of the bank is equal to the loan limit control and the loan lim- it is increasing in the buy-back price of the supplier. It is also shown that there exists a threshold about the buy-back price such that the ordering decision of the retailer is influenced by the risk control of the bank only when the buy-back price of the supplier is lower than the threshold. Finally, the numerical study was given to analyze the optimal pricing problem of the supplier.
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