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中文摘要：
在现实中交易信用是普遍存在的,交易信用的激励作用是供应链管理研究领域的重要课题。在生产商给定数量折扣的条件下,设计了零售商向生产商提前付款的交易信用激励机制,研究了分散式供应链的库存控制与协作问题,得到了供应链成员的最优订货批量、最优提前支付信用期以及系统最优新增利润。研究表明：在生产商的机会投资收益率较高时,通过采用基于数量折扣的交易信用激励机制,能够实现整个供应链的协调和成员企业利润境况的帕累托改善;而当零售商的机会投资收益率更大时,生产商不需要给予零售商数量折扣,此时可以提供延期付款激励机制以协调零售商的订货策略。最后,一个数值算例和敏感性分析说明了论文的模型。
英文摘要：
In real life, trade credit is prevalent, and the incentive effect of trade credit is an important topic in the field of supply chain management. Under the condition of quantity discount given by the producer, this paper designs incentives mechanism with trade credit where the retailer prepays for goods or services, and studies the problem of inventory control and coordination in a decentralized supply chain, We obtain the optimal lot-size, the optimal prepaid credit period for supply chain members and system＇s optimal profit gains. We show that incentives mechanism with trade credit based on quantity discount achieves supply chain coordination and the Pareto improvement of the parties＇ profits, if the producer＇s rate of return on capital investment is higher than the retailer＇ s. However, when the ret＇ailer＇s rate of return on capital investment is relatively larger, the producer needn＇t give any quantity discount to the retailer, and may allow the retailer a permissible delay in payments as an incentive mechanism, in order to coordinate the retailer＇s ordering policy. A numerical example and sensitivity analysis are provided to illustrate the proposed model.
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