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中文摘要：
行业潜规则在我国经济现实中广为存在，具有既有信息极不对称、未来信息反馈机制不畅、行业内部结盟性、行政监控成本高等特点。行业潜规则会侵蚀外部人利益，产生负外部性。长远来看，它将阻碍产业的发展，对其实行政府规制是必要的。在一定的假设前提下，以演化博弈为分析工具，研究得出结论：在一定环境条件下潜规则具有扩散性，并存在演化稳定点。并以我国食品安全管理中常用的抽查与处以罚金的方式作为规制形式，通过ESS分析，证明该规制方式有助于降低潜规则的扩散。
英文摘要：
Industry hidden rules widely exist in China＇s economic reality,which has such characteristics of highly symmetric information,information feedback mechanism lag behind,and internal alignment. Industry hidden rules lead consumer welfare erosion obviously in current period. It will result in hindering to the devel-opment of industry and market failure in the long run,so that the implementation of government regulation is necessary. Based on certain assumptions it has been found in this paper that the industry hidden rules is inva-sive under certain environmental condition by means of evolutionary game analysis,and the evolutionary stable point is existed. The selective examination and fine rules are common regulation fool in our country＇s food man-agement system China. It has been demonstrated that the regulation mode helps to reduce the spread of the hidden rules by the analysis of the ESS.
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