中共"十八大"以来,如何理解市场准入的行政审批体制改革的重要意义成为当前理论界的热点。与以往的实证研究不同,文章使用主流经济学模型(动态的创新竞争模型)对行政审批制度进行模型化的尝试,并深入分析该制度的具体经济绩效及其作用机制。主要结论如下:1)垄断性行业的生命周期比竞争性行业长,因此,若不能破除垄断,那么在垄断性行业淘汰落后产能是相对有效的产业政策。2)垄断性行业会带来更高的价格,并使在位企业获得更多经济利润,因此价格和利润规制是政府管理垄断性行业的必要工具。3)由于行政性准入壁垒挤出了消费者剩余,行业监管部门应该从企业所获得的垄断租金中征收额外的福利税,构建起向消费者进行转移支付的政策体系。4)垄断性行业会抑制行业内部的技术进步,因此需要监管部门实施创新激励。
How to understand the important significance of administrative approval system reform of market access since the 18 th CPC National Congress has become the hot topic in current theoretical realm.Different from previous empirical research,this paper models the administrative approval system by employing a mainstream economic model,i.e.dynamic competition innovation model,for the first time,and deeply analyzes the specific economic performance as well as its function mechanism.It comes to the main conclusions as follows:firstly,the life cycles of monopoly industries are longer than the ones of competitive industries,so the elimination of outdated capacity in monopoly industries is a relatively effective industrial policy if the monopoly cannot be abolished;secondly,monopoly industries give rise to much higher prices,and benefit the incumbent firms greatly by bringing more economic profits to them,so price and profit regulation are two essential tools for governments to manage monopoly industries;thirdly,since administrative entry barriers would extrude consumer surplus,the administration supervision departments should impose extra welfare tax on enterprises' monopoly rents,and build a policy system about transfer payments to consumers;fourthly,it is also necessary for supervision departments to implement innovation incentives since the existence of monopoly industries can inhibit technological progress inside the industries.