中文摘要：

建立了基于灰色博弈的巨灾保险多主体决策博弈模型。构建了公众与保险公司的灰色博弈矩阵,分析了公众和保险公司的选择策略以及政府的投保补贴比率和赔偿补贴比率对公众与保险公司决策的影响;得到了该灰色博弈的均衡策略,即公众选择投保,保险公司选择经营巨灾保险。证明了：当保险公司经营巨灾保险时,博弈结果是公众选择投保,而政府的投保补贴比率对公众的投保起到积极促进的作用;当公众选择投保,并且政府给保险公司的赔偿补贴比率α〉（L-P＋C）/L时,则博弈结果是保险公司选择经营巨灾保险。最后,采用Monte Carlo进行了模拟仿真计算,得出了当公众选择投保时,保险公司选择经营巨灾保险的风险。

英文摘要：

In this paper,the grey game model of catastrophe insurance multi-agent decision-making is established and the grey game matrix between public and insurance company is obtained.The subsidy ratio of government insurance and the subsidy ratio of compensation are analyzed for affecting the decision-making of both the public and the insurance companies.The grey game equilibrium strategy is obtained,that is,public chooses insure and insurance company chooses to manage catastrophe insurance.The following two conclusions are verified.Firstly,when the insurance company manages catastrophe insurance,the game result is that the public chooses insure,and the insure subsidy ratio of the government plays an active role in public insure.Secondly,when the public chooses insure and the compensation subsidy ratio,the game result is that insurance company chooses to manage catastrophe insurance.Finally,the simulations are conducted by Monte Carlo method for different parameter distribution.When the public chooses insure,the insurance company chooses to manage catastrophe insurance.