中文摘要：

针对湖域工业初始排污权定价问题。文章从多利益相关者合作视角出发，结合我国现阶段基本国情，利用合作博弈理论构建了基于多利益相关者合作的湖域工业初始排污权纳什议价（Nash—Bargaining）定价模型。即在满足湖域水环境排污权总量控制及区域产业规划调整方案的前提下，通过政府主体与行业主体之间考虑议价能力系数入影响的Nash—Bargaining，求解符合价格约束的行业初始排污权价格的最大满意解。其中，价格约束通过求解行业治污成本函数的Aumann-Shapley值给出。并以江苏省太湖流域纺织染整行业为例。针对湖域工业点源氨氮初始排污权定价河题，对比分析了Nash-Bargaining定价模型与江苏省太湖流域现行氨氮类资源价格，结果表明：议价能力系数入对Nash—Bargaining定价模型影响显著，A的合理区间为0．5≤A≤0．7，现行氨氮初始排污权价格对应于0．3〈A〈0．4时的情况，不利于初始排污权资源的可持续利用；现行氨氮初始排污权价格的标准化系数孝=0．91。以A=0．6时的价格为例。Nash—Bargaining定价模型所给出的价格的标准化指数ξ=0.85。具有比现行价格更强的资源补偿性能，考虑到太湖流域污染现状，Nash—Bargaining定价模型所得价格可行性更强。因此。建议适当调高氨氮初始排污权价格。

英文摘要：

Focusing on the pricing problem of industry initial discharge permits allocation in the lake basin area, from the perspective of multi-stakeholders＇ cooperation, based on Chinese fundamental realities, this paper uses cooperation game theory to build a Nash- Bargaining pricing model for the industry initial discharge permits allocation in lake basin area. Under the constraint condition of the total amount control of water environment discharge permits in lake basin area and the region＇s industrial adjustment planning, through the Nash-Bargaining by bargaining power parameter A effect between government and industrial agent, the paper finds the maximum satisfactory solution of industry initial discharge permits pricing under the pricing constraint condition. The constraint condition is given through solving the Aumann-Shapley value of industry＇s pollution treatment function. Taking the textile and dyeing industry of Taihu Lake Basin of Jiangsu Province, focusing on pricing problem of the industrial point source NH3-N initial discharge permits, making a comparative analysis between Nash-Bargaining pricing model and the current NH3-N resources price in Taihu Lake Basin of Jiangsu Province, the paper draws following results： bargaining power parameter A has an obvious impact on Nash-Bargaining pricing model; the reasonable range of A is 0.5≤A≤0.7; when the present price of NH3-N initial discharge permits is 0.3 〈 A 〈 0.4, it is not beneficial to sustainable use of initial discharge permits resource; if the present price of NH3-N initial discharge permits standardized coefficient is r =0.91, the pricing A =0.6, the standardized coefficient under the Nash-Bargaining pricing model is ξ = 0. 85, and resource compensation performance is better than the present price. Considering about the pollution situation of the Taihu Lake Basin, the Nash-Bargaining price will have better pricing feasibility. Thus, authors suggest the initial NH3-H discharge permits price should be increased.