中文摘要：

由于技术的复杂性与不确定性,研发外包近年来受到越来越多公司的青睐。但是信息泄露问题使得研发外包受到了一定的影响。鉴于此,本文利用委托代理机制建立了一个过程创新的研发外包选择模型,并用博弈论分析了无信息泄漏情况下外包与内部研发的边界,信息泄漏情况下外包与内部研发的边界及信息泄漏情况下外包与无信息泄漏情况下外包的边界。文章结论对于研发外包决策有重要参考价值。

英文摘要：

In recent years, due to technical complexity and uncertainty of research and development, R＆D Outsourcing has been favored by more and more companies. However, to a certain extent, the outsourcing of researeh and development was influenced by the information disclosure. In view of this, this paper constructs a selective model of research and development outsourcing with an innovative process through agency mechanism, and use game theory to analyze the border of the outsourcing and internal research and development without information disclosure, the border of the outsourcing of information leakage and internal research and development, and the border of the outsourcing of information leakage and no leakage of information. It offers valuable reference for the decisions of the research and development outsoureing.