中文摘要：

突破传统的现金流分析思路，从金融契约和决策权配置视角分析了管理者激励问题，认为外部投资者和经营者之间的决策权配置对经营者行动选择和投资者利益保护产生重要影响。模型分析结果表明，投资者和经营者之间的一般控制权分配并不必然与所有权相匹配，而是受到金融契约缔结过程中双方谈判力大小的影响，经营者最低让渡控制权大小受到投资者期望投资回报、市场监管环境和管理者团队声誉等五个因素影响。

英文摘要：

We discuss the problem of managerial incentive from the view- points of financial contracts and allocation of decision rights, and think that the allocation of decision rights between managers and investors exerts great influence on managers＇ action and protection of investors. The model shows, the allocation of control rights is not necessary matched with proper- ty, but is determined by the bargaining power between manager and investor in the course of writing financial contract. This study also indicates that five factors, including expectation of investment return,external supervision circumstance, managerial reputation, influence the minimization of control rights which need to be transferred from managers to investors.