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中文摘要：
本文从可转债视角分析我国企业高管人员激励机制。在分析将可转债用于我国企业高管人员激励机制设计的理论基础与现实背景的基础上，构建了一个可转债视角的高管人员激励模型，模型分析结果表明，只要对授予企业高管人员的可转债条款进行合理设计，即保证管理者行使转换期权后对企业价值增长的分享强度维持在一个特定的封闭区间，就能够有效规避其投资决策过程中的机会主义行为。文章进一步分析了可转债激励契约中各参数的影响因素并与纯权益激励契约进行了比较分析，结果表明可转债激励契约中回售和赎回条款是实现管理者对企业价值增长分享激励与保障性收益两者之间均衡的主要原因。
英文摘要：
This paper analyzes managerial incentive mechanism in Chinese enterprises from the view of convertible debt. Based on the discussion about theoretical foundation and practical background, the paper uses convertible debt as a managerial incentive instrument, and establishes a convertible debt incentive model. The model shows that well-designed convertible debt play an important role in controlling managerial opportunistic behavior in their investment decision as if manager＇s sharing level of value-creation is restricted in a given region. The authors further compare the model with equity-based incentive mechanism, and consider redemption and clause as the main reason to achieve equilibrium between sharing value-creation incentive and ensured income.
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