中文摘要：

高校科技成果转化率低一直是困扰我国高校与产业技术经济发展的大问题。在以协同转化为主要模式的高校科技成果转化中,委托代理问题是影响高校科技成果转化动力与成功度的主要障碍。解决委托代理问题,需要在科学的契约设计基础上提供有效的激励。为此,讨论了在引入科技中介机构的情况下,高校与科技中介机构在信息对称与信息不对称情形中的委托代理关系以及由此引发的对科技中介机构的激励问题。通过构建委托代理关系模型,并引入博弈论的思想进行模型求解,得到信息对称与不对称情形下的激励契约方案,并通过契约实施的结果比较分析,为设计与优化高校科技成果转化中的激励机制提供了启示。

英文摘要：

The low transformation rate of sci--tech achievements in Chinese universities is always a big problem which impedes the development of universities as well as the industrial technology and economy. Principal--agent problem is the most significant barrier of impetus and success of university sci--tech a- chievement transformation, especially of synergistic transformation. In order to solve this problem, effec- tive incentive system is required based on scientific contract design. Hence, the principal--agent relation- ship between university and newly introduced agent was mainly discussed in this paper, in which the caused incentive problem was also explored. Incentive contract program under situations of information symmetry and information asymmetry was gained through building of a principal--agent model, which was solved by game method. Some implications were offered for better design and optimization of incentive sys- tem of university sci--tech achievement transformation on the basis of comparative analysis of the results under two situations.