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中文摘要：
提出一种基于Swarm的仿真模型，对信息不完全市场下发电企业经营过程中的静态、动态和学习演化行为进行仿真．模型刻画了发电企业利用在博弈过程中所获取的信息，不断修正自己行为规则的演化过程．通过仿真发现：具有效仿能力的发电企业的平均供电量高于不具有效仿能力的发电企业；市场退出机制能够促进发电企业进行行为优化，最终生存在市场上的是能够准确预测对手的发电商，此时发电企业平均供电量高于无市场退出机制下发电企业；在无退出机制下，由于缺乏优化决策的激励，采用优化博弈模型的发电企业的个数较少．
英文摘要：
Imitative behavior is major factor which effects on equilibrium of electricity market because power suppliers in inferior position could imitate the game behavior of other power suppliers in the game process. A simulation model base on Swarm was proposed. In business game process with incomplete information, the static game behavior, dynamic game behavior and evolutionary game behavior of power suppliers were simulated. The model characterized the evolutionary game process in which power suppliers making use of the obtained information and continually modifies their behavior role. Result showed that the average power supply of suppliers with imitative behavior is higher than those without imitative behavior. The quit mechanism in market prompts power suppliers to optimize their game behavior. The power suppliers who can accurately predict the information of their opponent always survive in the end. The average power supply in market with quit mechanism is higher than in market without quit mechanism. In the market without quit mechanism, being short of the stimulation in optimization decision-making, few power suppliers adopt optimization game model.
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