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中文摘要：
现实中担保贷款的策略违约现象证实了其偿还率并不如理论预期那样高,担保贷款风险管理遇到新瓶颈.在前人研究基础上,试图将套牢理论引入中小企业奖惩机制,构造实力不同的两家非对称中小企业担保贷款模型,利用惩戒与授信的两种手段对企业实施激励,运用演化博弈模型论述风险控制机理.研究表明在一定范围内加大担保团体成员内部惩罚或授信可以有效降低策略违约的概率,降低套牢风险.
英文摘要：
The strategic default of guarantee loans confirms the repayment rate is not as high as theory expected.Risk management of guarantee loan encounters some new bottlenecks.This study is trying to propose model based on the hold-up and traditional game theory＇s assumption by taking the corporate punishment and incentive mechanism.It is attempted to discuss risk control mechanism by constructing guarantee loans model of two asymmetric SME which have different scales and strength,taking advantage of two means of implement discipline and credit incentives to the enterprise and using evolutionary game model.Further research demonstrates the effectiveness of hold-up risk control mechanism.Studies have shown that appropriately increasing the internal punishment of guarantee team members or bank＇s reward will effectively reduce the probability of strategies default and decrease the hold-up risk.
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