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技术创业型企业经理层股权分配模式探讨与融资结构优化
  • ISSN号:1008-3448
  • 期刊名称:《南开管理评论》
  • 时间:0
  • 分类:F275.1[经济管理—企业管理;经济管理—国民经济]
  • 作者机构:西安理工大学经济与管理学院
  • 相关基金:本文受国家自然科学基金项目(71272118)、高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目(20136118110008)资助
中文摘要:

适时融得外源资金、长久保持团队稳定是技术创业型企业持续发展急需解决的两大难题,此类企业融资结构的优化设计与跟进取得、产品差异性的持续保持、市场空间的迅速扩展等良好表现主要取决于创业经理层主观能动性的超常发挥。鉴于此,本文选择对技术创业型企业融资结构设计有参考价值的高新技术上市公司和非上市知名公司为样本,分析了经理层股权激励与企业融资结构的内在关系,发现股权激励能够发挥对债权融资向上的调节作用,或对股权融资向下的调节作用。针对技术创业型企业特点,提出了以企业“即时资本总量”减去融资总额、创业资本及按市场上常规债务融资成本计算得出的创业资本增值后的“即时剩余资本增量”。为创业经理层股权公平量化分配的依据;并结合创业经理层“持自有技术、创自己事业”的终极目标,构建出既保证原始出资人利益期望、又有利于创业经理层团队稳定的融资结构。研究结论可为技术创业型企业设计创业经理层股权动态分配模式提供参考,为优化融资结构和稳定创业经理层团队提供借鉴。

英文摘要:

Two urgent problems of technology-based entrepreneurial firms are timely raising foreign capital and keeping the team stable.Technology-based entrepreneurial firms' financing structure' s optimization designing, capital acquiring and market space rapidly expanding mainly depend on the subjective initiative of entrepre- neurial managers. Different from general enterprise managers, en- trepreneurial managers not only develop a product, but also run the enterprise. Technology investments proposed by the ministry of sci- ence and equity incentive of listed companies just give the managers economic interests rather than the authority of making decisions. Managers' purpose is to start a business with the ability of tech- nology development and manage the firm accordingly. But there is no way to complete managers' goal with the above-mentioned incentive mechanism. In fact, the managers' unreasonable financial decision leading bankruptcy cases are not rare. On account of this, we choose Chinese listed companies and non-listed established companies as samples to analyze the inherent relationship between equity incentive and external financing structure. This research finds out that equity incentive can improve the proportion of debt financing and lower equity financing ratio of the enterprise financ- ing structure. Based on the technology-based entrepreneurial firms characteristics and equity incentive regulating effect on the equity financing and debt financing, we present the theory for ownership incentive equity allocation that use the immediate surplus capital increment which based on the result of immediate capital amount minus the expectations of capital appreciation. Then use model to calculate the equity reversal point and propose enterprise managers participate in the distribution of the immediate surplus capital in- crement by 70%. In reference to the listed company equity incentive regulating effect on the equity financing and debt financing and the ultimate goal of entrepreneurial managers that creat

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期刊信息
  • 《南开管理评论》
  • 北大核心期刊(2011版)
  • 主管单位:国家教育部
  • 主办单位:南开大学商学院
  • 主编:李维安
  • 地址:天津市南开区卫津路94号南开大学商学院
  • 邮编:300071
  • 邮箱:
  • 电话:022-23505995 23498167
  • 国际标准刊号:ISSN:1008-3448
  • 国内统一刊号:ISSN:12-1288/F
  • 邮发代号:6-130
  • 获奖情况:
  • 天津市第八届优秀期刊评选特别荣誉奖,第二届北方十佳期刊
  • 国内外数据库收录:
  • 中国中国人文社科核心期刊,中国北大核心期刊(2008版),中国北大核心期刊(2011版),中国北大核心期刊(2014版),中国社科基金资助期刊,中国国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库
  • 被引量:26296