中文摘要：

本文以中集集团股票期权激励为例,从股票期权激励计划草案公告时点的机会主义选择、以及围绕股票期权激励计划草案公告前后的信息披露和盈余管理机会主义择机三个方面,分析上市公司股票期权激励计划推出前后的机会主义择时行为。研究发现,管理层为了降低行权价格,以最大化股票期权预期收益,会有意识选择公司股价较低点时公告股权激励计划草案,并且倾向于在草案公告前披露坏消息、推迟好消息,同时实施向下盈余管理,以配合机会主义择时行为。本文研究为理解股权激励所诱发的机会主义择时、信息披露和盈余管理等败德行为如何被组合运用,提供了证据和系统化的思路,不仅能从契约要素设定视角丰富股权激励代理问题文献,还可以为完善股权激励行权价格要素设计提供政策参考。

英文摘要：

Based on China International Marine Containers（Group）Co.,Ltd（CIMC Group）,this paper analyzes the opportunistic timing behaviors around the draft announcement of stock option incentive plan,from the timing of the draft announcement of stock option incentive plan,the timing of the information disclosure and earnings management before and after announcement of the equity incentive plan.This paper finds that：In order to reduce the exercise price of stock option to maximize their expected return from stock option incentive,senior management will deliberately choose to announce the draft of equity incentive plan when the company stock price is low,and tend to early release bad news and delay the disclosure of good news,at the same time,implement downward earnings management prior to the announcement of stock option incentive to coincide with the opportunistic timing behavior.This study provides empirical evidence and systematic thinking for people to understand how the opportunistic timing,information disclosure and earnings management induced by the equity incentive are employed in combination,and the research results not only enrich the literature of agent problems from the perspective of equity incentive contract elements setting,but also can provide useful policy reference to improve the design of exercise price in the equity incentive plan.