中文摘要：

在中国公司治理由行政型向经济型转型的背景下，国企“高管任免行政化”特征难以忽视。文章手工整理了2004—2014年省属国企负责人（董事长和总经理）的籍贯信息及离任去向与升降数据，利用籍贯信息判断其与省委书记、组织部长的同乡关系，首次探究了同乡关系对省属国企负责人晋升概率的影响。研究发现，（与省委书记、组织部长的）同乡关系对省属国企负责人的晋升概率具有正向影响，这种正向影响在有政治关联的省属国企负责人样本中更加明显。文章进一步以地方党委领导体制的“一正两副”模式推行作为外生事件，检验了在“减副”前后，与组织部长的同乡关系对省属国企负责人晋升概率的正向影响是否存在差异。结果显示，与组织部长存在同乡关系的省属国企负责人在“减副”后具有更高的晋升概率，这进一步验证了文章假设的合理性。

英文摘要：

Under the background of corporate governance in China transiting from administration governance to economic governance, the feature of administrative executive appointment and dismissal in SOEs is difficult to be ignored. This paper has a hand collec- tion of hometown information and position changes of provincial SOEs＇ chairmen and gen- eral managers from 2004 to 2014, and employs hometown information to distinguish whether they are tongxiang with the secretaries of provincial party committees and the heads of organization departments. It explores the effect of tongxiang guanxi on provincial state-owned enterprises ~ executive promotion for the first time. It finds that tongxiang guanxi has a positive impact on the promotion probability of the heads of provincial state- owned enterprises, and this positive impact is more obvious in the sample of the heads of provincial state-owned enterprises with political connections. Additionally, it uses the cut of deputy leaders as an exogenous event and tests whether there are differences in the posi- tive effects of tongxiang guanxi with the heads of organization departments on the promo- tion probability of the heads of provincial state-owned enterprises before and after the cut of deputy leaders. It shows that the heads of provincial state-owned enterprises with tongx- iang guanxi with the heads of organization departments have higher promotion probability after the cut of deputy leaders, further confirming the rationality of hypotheses.