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中文摘要：
过度自信作为人们的一种经常性心理偏好,对上市公司经理股票期权补偿必将产生重要影响,系统地研究过度自信对上市公司经理股票期权补偿的影响机理具有重要的理论意义和应用价值.论文借鉴前人提出的过度自信表示方法,在假设公司股东风险中性、经理风险厌恶且过度自信的条件下,利用一个简单的两期资本预算决策模型和实物期权思想,建立恰当的数学模型对过度自信条件下的上市公司经理股票期权补偿问题进行探索性研究.研究结果表明,在一定条件下,使公司价值最大化和使公司股东收益最大化的股票期权补偿数量都将随着经理过度自信程度的提高而减少;使公司价值最大化的股票期权补偿数量大于使股东收益最大化的股票期权补偿数量.
英文摘要：
As a kind of cowanon psychological preference, overconfidence is bound to make the important effect on the manager＇s stock option compensation of the listed company. Researching systematically the effect mechanism of overconfidence on the listed company manager＇s stock option compensation has the important theoretical meaning and applied value. Using the expressing methods of overconfidence provided by many scholars for reference, under the hypotheses condition that the stockholders are risk neutral and the manager is risk aversion and overconfident, making use of a simple two-period capital budgeting decision model and real option idea, this paper studies the effect of the manager＇s overconfident psychological preference on his stock option compensation by setting up an appropriate mathematical model. The results show that, the stock option compensation amount maximized the firm value and that amount maximized the stockholder＇s return are decreased in the manager＇s overconfident level under the certain conditions; and the stock option compensation amount maximized the finn value are greater than that amount maximized the stockholder＇s return.
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