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中文摘要：
通过把控股股东代理的影响内生到实物期权模型中,分析了控股股东代理对负债代理成本的影响.研究结果认为,控股股东的存在加大了债权人与股东之间的信息不对称程度、提高了负债融资的代理成本,并导致企业过早投资.随着控股股东现金流权的提高,负债融资代理成本逐渐降低,表明控股股东对公司治理具有激励效应;随着控股股东现金流权和控制权分离程度的加大,资产替代问题变得更加严重,表现为负债代理成本逐渐提高,表明控股股东对公司治理具有侵占效应.
英文摘要：
By incorporating tl-e factor of controlling shareholders into real options models, the effect of controlling shareholders on the agency costs of debt financing is analyzed synthetically. The result shows that occurring of controlling shareholders increases the information asymmetry between creditors and shareholders and induces more early investment. With the increase of cash flow of controlling shareholders, agency costs of debt financing decreases, which testifies the ＂incentive effects＂ of controlling shareholders. With the increase of separation of cash flow rights and control rights, asset substitution problem becomes severe and the agency costs of debt financing increase, which testifies the ＂entrenchment effects＂ of controlling shareholders.
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