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中文摘要：
公司投资一现金流敏感性随着股权制衡程度的下降和控股股东持股比率的上升呈现倒U型关系。在股权制衡结构下,控股股东和监督股东对投资一现金流敏感性的影响基本上支持自由现金流假说，而“一股独大”公司的控股股东持股比例越高，投资一现金流敏感系数反而越低，从而验证了基于信息不对称的公司投资行为理论。此外，不同产权性质的控股股东和监督股东在股权制衡条件下，对公司投资一现金流敏感性的影响存在显著性差异。
英文摘要：
We find out that the inverse U-shape relations between the investment-cashflow sensitivity and control shareholder as the block-shareholder turns big. Under the balance structure of the ownership with several blocks, the relationships between the main bloekholders and investment-eashflow sensitivity test the hypothesis of free cash-flow theory. It supports the asymmetric information theory when the investment-cash flow sensitivity decreases as the largest shareholder holding increases. There is significant difference about the effect from the equity character of the inside and outside bloekholders on the investment-eashflow sensitivities.
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