中文摘要：

关于机构投资者在公司治理中是否具有积极作用，一直存在分歧和争议。本文基于薪酬契约设计理论，探讨了机构投资者特质对高管薪酬及其私有收益的影响，以探究不同特质的机构投资者在公司治理中扮演的角色，据此深入分析股东监督机制和经理激励机制之间的相互关系。研究发现，从机构投资者的独立性特质来看，独立机构投资者不仅能加强薪酬一业绩敏感性，而且可以大大降低高管的货币型和非货币型私有收益，这揭示出股东监督机制和管理者激励机制的互补关系；同时，从机构投资者持股期限来看，长期机构投资者能够显著降低高管的货币型和非货币型私有收益，但是不能显著提高薪酬一盈余业绩敏感性，这意味着股东监督机制和管理者激励机制之间呈现出替代关系。研究结论表明，不同的公司治理机制之间并不是孤立起作用的，而是相互影响的，既可能互相补充，也可能互相替代。

英文摘要：

It has been disputable whether institutional investors play an active role in cor- porate governance.Based on the theory of compensation contract design, this paper discusses the effects of different types of institutional investors on executive compensation and private benefits to explore the role of institutional investors with different traits in corporate govern- ance and accordingly deep analyze the relationship between shareholder supervision mecha- nism and managerial incentive mechanism. It comes to the results as follows, firstly, as for the independence of institutional investors, independent institutional investors not onlystrengthen the pay-for-performance sensitivity, but also lead to sharp reduction in monetary and non-monetary private benefits of executives, revealing the complementary relationship between shareholder supervision mechanism and managerial incentive mechanism; secondly, as for shareholding duration of institutional investors, long-term institutional investors can significantly reduce monetary and non-monetary private benefits of executives, but cannot ob- viously result in the increase in the pay-for-performance sensitivity, showing the substitution relationship between shareholder supervision mechanism and managerial incentive mecha- nism.It indicates that different corporate governance mechanisms are interactive： comple- mentary relationship or substitution relationship.