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中文摘要：
文章使用2004—2013年我国国有上市公司数据，考察了国有企业金字塔层级如何影响经理激励契约，以及这种影响在不同政治关联的情况下是否存在差异。研究发现，国有企业的金字塔层级越长，经理薪酬与会计业绩的相关性越强，经理更可能因糟糕的会计业绩而被更换；同时，在经理没有政治关联的样本中，上述现象更加明显。上述结果说明，国有企业金字塔结构是政府放权的一种制度安排，降低了国有企业面临的政治成本。但文章也发现，对于业绩良好的企业，金字塔层级过长可能导致经理拥有过度权力，从而出现操纵薪酬的现象。文章的发现对于深化国有企业改革具有重要的政策含义。
英文摘要：
Using the data of Chinese state-owned listed firms from 2004 to 2013, this paper examines the effect of pyramidal layers of state-owned enterprises on managers＇ in-centive contracts, and the differences of the above effect under different political connec- tions. It shows that the longer the pyramidal layers of state-owned enterprises is, the stronger the correlation between executive compensation and accounting performance is and the more manages are likely to be replaced owing to bad accounting performance; meanwhile, in the sample of managers without political connections, the above phenome- non is more obvious. These above results indicate that the pyramid structure of state- owned enterprises is a kind of institutional arrangement of government decentralization, and reduces the political costs state-owned enterprises face. However, it also finds that for enterprises with good performance, too long pyramidal layers may lead to excessive power of managers, resulting in executives＇ compensation manipulation. These findings provide policy implications for deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises.
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