中文摘要：

技术交易中，专利权人与竞争者（潜在的侵权者）之间是典型的主从对策关系，而行动的先后顺序对双方的最终收益会产生重大地影响。本文分别建立一主一从和一主多从的模型，分析研究专利权人面对单个侵权者或者多个侵权者时，各方的均衡策略。通过一主一从模型，我们发现，只有在竞争者先行动的前提下才会出现“侵权倾向与罚金数正相关”的特殊现象；通过一主多从模型的分析，发现专利权人的“主方优势”比较明显，而竞争者只有在先行动时，才能争取主动，促使专利权人的打击力度尽量小，从而使自己的收益尽量高。

英文摘要：

In the technology transaction, the relationship between patent holders and competitors （potential infringers） is a typical leader - follower strategy. And the sequence of actions influences the payoff of both sides greatly. Models of ＂leader - one follower＂ and ＂leader- multiple followers＂ are set up respecti -vely, in order to analyze the strategies and equilibria in situations that a patent holder faces single or multiple competitors. According to the ＂leader -one follower＂ model, the corollary ＂likelihood of entry increases with the penalty＂ can only exist if the competitor acts preemptively. And results from the ＂leader -multiple followers＂ model indicates that the ＂leading advantage＂ lies definitely with the holder and that competitors need preemption to maximize their payoff by stimulating the holder to mitigate the litigation.