中文摘要：

选取350家沪市A股制造业2008-2013年度的数据构建非平衡面板,研究债务融资行为的效率性问题：是企业价值的激励工具还是高管团队（TMT）薪酬自利的隐性操纵？实证检验表明,企业债务融资具有显著的价值激励功能,但在债务融资过程中亦存在TMT薪酬的自利行为,导致高管-员工薪酬差距因此扩大。进一步研究发现,国有控股企业中债务融资的价值激励效果更为显著,而民营企业中TMT薪酬自利现象则更甚;TMT还通过操纵债务期限结构以达到自利目的,而这一行为将会损害债务融资对于企业价值的激励效果。因此,监督部门要注意防范TMT过度的薪酬自利和对债务期限的隐性操纵行为,同时设计更为合理的高管薪酬契约。

英文摘要：

Selecting 350 manufacturing industry 2008-2013 data of Shanghai A-share to build non-balanced panel,this paper studies the efficiency of debt financing behavior： whether it is the incentive tool of enterprise value or the hidden manipulate of executive team（ TMT） self-interest？ The empirical test shows that corporate debt financing has significant value incentive function,but there is also self-interest behavior of TMT salary in the process of debt financing,which leads to the widening of employee-employee pay gap. Further research found that the value of debt financing in state-owned holding enterprises is more effective,while the private sector TMT pay self-interest phenomenon is even more; at the same time research shows that TMT also through the manipulation of the debt structure to achieve self-behavior will undermine the incentive effect of debt financing on corporate value. Therefore,the supervisory department should pay attention to prevent TMT excessive self-interest and implicit manipulation of the debt maturity,and design a more reasonable executive compensation contract.