中文摘要：

中国产能过剩问题在金融危机后愈加突出,商业银行作为信用资源配给的关键部门,其授信行为在此背景下是否遵循了市场化原则还有待商榷。论文以中国上市银行2001-2012年的经验证据为样本,重点分析了金融危机后产能过剩下中国商业银行的信贷资源配置行为。研究表明,中国商业银行的信贷资源配置遵循市场化原则。但是,基于控股股东持股结构视角的进一步研究发现,控股股东持股结构对在产能过剩下商业银行信贷资源配置行为具有负面影响,但该负面影响并不显著。论文从产能过剩视角为中国商业银行信贷资源配置行为趋于市场化和商业银行股权改革的红利逐步释放提供了实证证据。

英文摘要：

China’s overcapacity is increasingly deteriorating because of the financial crisis. It is a central event whether commercial Banks,as the key sector of credit rationing,fol ow the principles of the market to crediting under this background. Based on the statistics from 2001 to 2012 of china’s listed Banks,we’re discussing and analyzing its action about how to al ocate credit under the excess capacity after the financial crisis. The study shows that china’s commercial bank credit al ocation has obeyed market-oriented principle. Therefore,further studies based on the structure of control ing shareholder have found which has an negative impact on the behavior of commer-cial bank’s credit al ocation under the excess capacity,but this impact is not significant. This article provides empirical evidence for China’s commercial Banks’ credit al ocation in term of overcapaci-ty,which further validate the dividend bringing by reform of Commercial bank gradual y releasing.