中文摘要：

政府采购制度是我国财政领域和公共品提供机制上的一次重大制度创新,使其在强化政府宏观调控能力、增强财政监督职能和节约财政支出等方面起到了积极作用。但是,由于制度设计的＂漏洞＂,政府采购领域存在着寻租现象,其中一种寻租的类型是企业合谋竞租。利用拓展的Tullock集体寻租博弈模型,对政府采购过程中参与要素的建模及对模型的解构分析,发现：其一,政府采购中企业合谋竞标是企业在目前竞标情景下,基于自身利益做出的理性选择。联盟形成后,联盟规模与联盟内部规则中平均主义要素比例和整个政府采购中参与竞标的经销商数量呈负相关关系。其二,从整个社会的角度来看,企业的合谋行为悄无声息地规避了政府采购中竞争性制度设计,在我们无法彻底将寻租活动从政府采购中消灭的时候,直接针对这种合谋行为的规制是降低政府采购活动给社会带来无谓损失的有效手段。

英文摘要：

The government procurement system is a major institutional innovation in Chinese financial sector and the public goods supply mechanism. It has played a positive role in strengthening the government macroeconomic regulation, controlling the ability of financial supervision function and fiscal expenditure saving, and etc. However, there exists a phenomenon of rent seeking due to the vulnerability of the system design. One type of rent seeking is conspiring to rent seeking enterprises. This paper analyzed the elements of participation in the government procurement process, in modeling and analyzing model of deconstruction by Tullock collective rent seeking game model, and found. First, the enterprise conspired bidding in government procurement is a kind of rational choice based on their own interests under current scenario. After the formation of the union, the union rules egalitarianism elements in proportion and the entire government procurement bid showed a negative correlation between the number of dealers. Second, from the point of view of the whole society, the enterprise conspiracy behavior evades the competitive system design of the government procurement quietly. If we can not completely eliminate the rent seeking activities in government procurement, regulations forbidding the collusion behavior is the best ways to reduce deadweight loss to society caused by the rent seeking activities in the procurement.