以公司年报披露为事件,用知情交易概率直接衡量定期公告期间的信息不对称水平,并通过事件研究法分析公告期间信息不对称对价格发现的影响。研究结果表明,公告前信息不对称程度加剧,且与公司规模成反比;公告前信息不对称程度越高,股价对信息的揭示越多,公告后股价持续漂移越少。但是基于私有信息的价格发现损害了中小投资者的利益,因此要加强对这类违规行为的监管。
Taking annual reports disclosure as the event, information asymmetry is directly measured by PIN (probability of informed trading) and its effect on price discovery is explored through event study around periodical reports Empirical results show that information asymmetry aggravates before public release of annual reports and it is inversely proportional to firm size. The results also show that the more asymmetric information is before announcements, the more information revealed by prices and the less prices drift after announcements. However, price discovery based on private information causes damage to the benefit of medium and small investors, so supervision of such illegal behaviors must be strengthened.