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中文摘要：
基于进化博弈复制动态分析方法,建立移动服务商群体进化博弈模型,并对移动服务商合作行为进行分析。首先,扩展一般的进化博弈模型为成本分摊与收益共享的群体博弈模型,然后,探讨了服务商收益与惩罚力度不同大小关系下进化稳定策略。博弈分析结果表明,移动服务商群体进化博弈模型中,收益、成本与惩罚大小和群体初始比例等将直接影响博弈结果。合理的惩罚参数设置,能有效的规范服务商进化行为。
英文摘要：
Based on replicated dynamic method of evolutionary game,we build the evolutionary game model for mobile service providers,and analyse cooperative performance among them.After extending the traditional evolutionary game model to a cost-shared and profit-shared game model,we explore the evolutional stable strategy,of which the income of provders is relative to the degree of punishment.The game result shows that profit,cost,initial group percentage and punishment parameters directly affect the game result.The reasonable settings for punishment parameter can effectively adjust behavior of mobile service providers.
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