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中文摘要：
收益分配作为PPP模式中的一个关键决策对项目的成功运行具有重要影响。本文引入Stackelberg博弈模型,分别讨论和比较在集中决策与分散决策下的参与者最优努力水平和最佳收益分配方案,并进一步采用Rubinstein讨价还价博弈模型探究集中式决策下的利润分配。研究发现集中式决策下的努力水平和项目整体利益相对于分散式决策下的努力水平和项目整体利益都有所提高,并且通过对集中式决策下PPP项目的总体利润的合理分配可以实现帕累托改进。
英文摘要：
Income distribution, as a key decision of PPP mode, exerts a significant impact on the successful operation of a project. This paper introduces Stackelberg game model to analyze and compare the optimal effort level and income distribution of participants under two different decision situations including decentralized and centralized decision. Furthermore, using Rubinstein bargaining model, it discusses the profits distribution under centralized decision. The results show that the effort level and overall interests of the project under centralized decision are improved with respect to the situation under decentralized decision. Besides, reasonable profit allocation of the centralized decision could realize ＂Pareto improvements＂.
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