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中文摘要：
在传统产学研合作委托代理模型中引入技术价值变量,并尝试运用再谈判机制和控制权配置理论,揭示出技术价值不确定性情况下的最优利益分配机制。结论显示,合理配置控制权的再谈判可增加合作剩余,而控制权的配置取决于初始谈判力与努力的产出弹性的关系以及谈判力受技术价值影响的程度;一般情况下,初始谈判力弱的一方拥有控制权更利于增大企业价值。
英文摘要：
This paper introduces technology value factor based on traditional moral risk model of IURCI, and tries to use the theory of control rights allocation and negotiation mechanism, revealing the optimal distribution mechanism while technology value is uncertain. The results show that, reasonable allocation of control rights could increase the cooperation surplus, and how to allocate control rights depends on the relationship between initial bargaining power and the output elasticity of efforts as well as the degree of bargaining power influenced by technical value, under normal circumstances, the control right allo- cated to a weak bargaining power is more conducive to increase the enterprise value.
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