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中文摘要：
由于生态产业链中上、下游企业和政府所掌握信息的不对称性，企业追求利益最大化，而政府主要履行监督管理和导向作用，因此生态产业链中上、下游企业间及政府存在长期的博弈行为。以上、下游企业和政府为博弈主体，基于博弈主体有限理性和有限信息假设，建立三方合作关系的演化博弈模型，并分析其演化稳定策略和主要的影响因素，最后给出相关的政策建议。
英文摘要：
Due to upper middle enterprises, downstream enterprises of the ecological industry chain and the government having the asymmetry of information, as well as companies seeking to maximize interests and the main performance of the government to supervise and guide, there is a game between enterprises （upper middle and downstream enterprises） and government behaviors. In this paper, with the upstream and downstream enterprises and government as the main body in the game and based on bounded rationality and limit- ed information hypothesis, we establish evolutionary game model of tripartite cooperation relationship and replicated dynamic equation, and analyze its evolutionary stable strategy and the main influence factors. The results showed that the long-term equilibrium of the up- stream enterprises＇ stable strategies are mainly affected by the game subject paying for technical improvement and waste disposal costs, the pay of by-product from the downstream enterprises wanting to purchase and the extent of governments＇ rewards or punishments; downstream enterprises are mainly affected by technical renovation costs and government＇s rewards or punishments ; if under the condi- tion that the government＇s regulation is strong, upstream and downstream enterprises are inclined to adopt the cooperation strategy. In order to achieve the cooperation between enterprises and government＇s stable regulation are in equilibrium state, we give the relevant policy recommendations finally.
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Study on Optimization of Collaborative Innovation Network Structures Based on Grey Property of Knowl
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