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中文摘要：
研究由一个零售商和一个风险规避的供应商组成的供应链，考虑在该供应链中，当供应商可能发生突发事件的情况下，使用罚金合同协调该供应链的问题。建立了两阶段模型，研究发现，供应商应支付的最优罚金数量是零售商的订单拖欠成本和供应链恢复所需时间的乘积；存在罚金合同时，供应商的恢复时间将减小，而预防措施将增加；另外相对于风险中性的供应商，风险规避的供应商采取的预防措施将会更加充分。
英文摘要：
The supply chain consisting of one retailer and one risk aversion supplier is researched. In this supply chain, the supplier may be subjected to disruption. The disrupted supply chain is coordinated by penalty contract. Two- stage model is set up. It is shown that the optimal penalty which the supplier should pay to the retailer equals to the product of the retailer＇s backorder cost and the recovery time of the supply chain. It is also shown that the supplier＇s recovery time is shortened and the preventive measures are increased if there is penalty contract. In addition, it is demonstrated that compared with risk neutral supplier, the risk aversion supplier should take more preventive measures.
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New parametric prioritization methods for an analytical hierarchy process based on a pairwise compar
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