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中文摘要：
制造商和供应商在需求信息交流时,双方的信息判断存在差距,由此可能会造成彼此的不信任.考虑这种不信任的程度并将其看作是一个随机变量,其中供应商对制造商不信任程度的阈值不能太大,否则无法得到博弈论的均衡决策.数值研究表明如果单位保险金和单位价格补偿相同的话,两者对于供应商的产能决策的影响是相等的.
英文摘要：
When communicating between manufacturer and supplier about demand, the gap between supply chain member might induce potential distrust for each other. Considering distrust level as a random variable, threshold of distrust level for supplier to request insurance or price- compensation cannot be too loose for getting an equilibrium solution in the game theory based decisions. Numerical studies show that if the unit-insurance or unit-price-compensation are equal, supplier＇s capacity decision will be equal in the two methods.
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