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中文摘要：
创业投资联盟中企业家通过出让股权获得投资家的融资,投资家提供非资本增值服务。如何获得足够资本和服务以实现联盟目标,同时又能防范企业的核心技术泄露是一个重要的问题。基于企业家角度,企业家选择有效的风险控制机制能够使资源获取和知识泄露二者保持平衡。将创业投资联盟的风险分为关系风险和绩效风险,将联盟的控制方式分为联盟范围选择和股权控制,来验证假设的合理性。结论表明,控制联盟风险对创业投资联盟的治理具有重要意义。
英文摘要：
Entrepreneurs share equity with venture capitalists aim to gain capital and non-financial value-added services in venture capital alliances.How to maintain sufficiently capital and services from investors to achieve alliance objectives is an important problem while controlling knowledge flows to avoid leakage of valuable technology.Based on the perspective of entrepreneurs,choosing appropriate control mechanisms to reduce alliance risks can keep a balance between services and leakage in venture capital alliances.In this paper the risks are considered separately as relational risk and performance risk and the governance mechanisms are sorted by equity control and scope control.The relationship between alliance risks and control mechanisms are demonstrated as being significant in venture capital alliances.
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