中文摘要：

同时考虑离职倾向与解聘倾向,依据经营者下期继续连任、补偿离职以及非补偿离职三种可能性及其出现的概率确定经营者期望效用和企业期望收益,并建立二阶段动态激励模型.研究得出如下五点结论：第一,经营者离职倾向越大,努力程度越低,对业绩分享比例的要求越高;第二,经营者相同努力水平获得的解聘补偿高于下期基础薪酬提升幅度时,解聘倾向越大,经营者努力水平越高,对业绩分享比例的要求越低;第三,动态基础薪酬制度有助于提升经营者努力水平;第四,行业垄断盈余比例越大,经营者努力水平越低;第五,业绩分享系数与非货币效用敏感度越大,经营者努力水平越高.

英文摘要：

Considering turnover intention and dismissal tendency,managers ’ two-stage dynamic incentive model was designed in which managers ’ expected u tility and enterprises ’ expected return were determined according to the three possibilities and probabilities of re- election, compensation turnover and non-compensation turnover. Five conclusions were drawn as follows. Firstly,the greater a manager ’ s turnover intention is,the lower his effort is and the higher his requirement for the performance share ratio will be. Secondly, when a manager gets more dismissal payment than the increase of basic salary in the next period while he provides the same effort,the more the dismissal intention is,and the greater the manager ’ s effort is,the lower his requirement for the performance share ratio will be. Thirdly,the dynamic basic salary system can help to improve managers’ effort. Fourthly, the higher the proportion of monopolistic surplus is, the lower the manager ’ seffort will be. F in a lly,the greater the performance share ratio and the non-monetary utility sensitivity are,the higher the manager’seffort will be.