中文摘要：

本文基于经典代理理论和行为代理理论,并依据激励条件和激励有效期将股票期权区分为＂激励型＂和＂福利型＂两类,分别考察激励程度与高管风险承担水平之间的关系。此外,本文引进市场竞争调节变量,研究其对此二者关系的影响。实证研究发现：（1）＂激励型＂股票期权激励程度与高管风险承担水平呈倒U型关系,＂福利型＂股票期权激励程度与高管风险承担水平呈线性负相关关系;（2）市场竞争越激烈,＂激励型＂高管股票期权激励与风险承担之间的倒U型关系越滞后,＂福利型＂高管股票期权激励与风险承担之间的负相关关系越弱。

英文摘要：

This paper integrates the two theories of Traditional Agency Theory and Behavioral Agent Theory, and then takes the vesting conditions and exercising validity period as the standard, and divide all the samples into two categories： ＂incentivedriven type＂ and ＂welfare-driven type＂. Then, the effects of executive stock option incentive on the risk-taking of these two types of enterprises were investigated respectively. In addition, this paper also examines the infl uence of market competition on the relationship between the two variables. The results show that, fi rst, the relationship of executive option incentive and risk taking presents a ＂inverted U＂ shape in the ＂incentive-driven＂ group, and presents a negative correlation in the ＂welfare-driven＂ group. Second, the higher the market competition, ＂incentive-driven＂ executive stock option incentive and risk taking on the ＂inverted U＂ relationship is more lagging behind, the weaker will be the negative relationship between ＂welfare-driven＂ executive stock option incentive and risk taking.