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考虑长短期努力的过度自信代理人激励机制
  • ISSN号:1007-3221
  • 期刊名称:《运筹与管理》
  • 时间:0
  • 分类:F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]
  • 作者机构:东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110167
  • 相关基金:国家自然科学基金项目(71271048,71202154);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金(博导类)项目(20130042110032);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(规划基金项目16YJA630048);国家社会科学基金项目(17BGL244)
中文摘要:

以相对净收益为标准设计代理人薪酬契约,同时考虑代理人过度自信及长短期努力水平,并区分长短期努力的冲突性与非冲突性,分别建立非货币效用计量模型和代理人最优激励模型,探索各项因素对代理人努力水平及业绩分享比例的影响。研究发现如下几点主要结论:第一,垄断行业代理人努力水平远远低于竞争性行业,且行业垄断程度越高,代理人努力水平越低。第二,行业垄断盈余比例与业绩分享比例之间的关系受委托人与代理人过度自信程度影响,当代理人过度自信系数高于委托人时,行业垄断程度越高,业绩分享比例越大,反之结论相反。第三,代理人对有利状态过度自信程度越高,对不利状态过度自信程度越低,代理人努力水平与业绩分享比例越高;委托人对有利状态过度自信程度越高,对不利状态过度自信程度越低,代理人努力水平与业绩分享比例越低。第四,代理人努力水平与边际非货币收益正相关,与边际非货币成本呈负向变化关系。

英文摘要:

This paper regarded "relative net profit" as performance measurement standards to design agent' s compensation contracts. It established non-monetary utility measurement models and agent' s optimal incentive model to explore the influence of various factors on agent' s effort and performance share proportion, which took into account agent' s overconfidence degree and his long-term and short-term effort, distinguished the conflict and non-conflict between short-term effort and long-term effort. It found four major conclusions as follows: First, agents in monopoly industries make less effort than ones in competitive industries and the greater the monopoly earnings proportion is, the less effort agents make. Second, the relationship between monopoly earnings propor- tion and performance share ratio is affected by overconfidence degree of agents and clients, that the greater the monopoly earnings proportion is, the higher the performance share proportion is when agent' s overconfidence coefficient is higher than principal' s, on the contrary, the conclusion is opposite when agent' s overconfidence coefficient is lower than principal' s. Third, the higher the agent' s overconfidence degree to favorable condition and the lower to unfavorable position is, the greater the agent' s effort and performance share proportion are ; the higher the principal's overconfidence degree to favorable condition and the lower to unfavorable position is, the lower the agent' s effort and performance share proportion are. Four, agent' s effort is positive correlation with marginal non-monetary income and displays negative correlation with marginal non-monetary cost.

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期刊信息
  • 《运筹与管理》
  • 北大核心期刊(2011版)
  • 主管单位:中国科学技术协会
  • 主办单位:中国运筹学会
  • 主编:俞嘉第
  • 地址:安徽省合肥市合肥工业大学系统工程研究所
  • 邮编:230009
  • 邮箱:xts_or@hfut.edu.cn
  • 电话:0551-2901503
  • 国际标准刊号:ISSN:1007-3221
  • 国内统一刊号:ISSN:34-1133/G3
  • 邮发代号:26-191
  • 获奖情况:
  • 安徽省优秀科技期刊
  • 国内外数据库收录:
  • 中国中国科技核心期刊,中国北大核心期刊(2008版),中国北大核心期刊(2011版),中国北大核心期刊(2014版)
  • 被引量:11977