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中文摘要：
文章研究有一个零售商及一个有促销行为的供应商组成供应链协调问题。利用博弈论及比较静态分析法，得到如下结论：零售商的订货量随供应商促销努力水平的增加；批发合同契约不能协调该供应链，在批发合同以及促销成本分担契约的合同参数满足一定条件时供应链达到协调。数值算例显示：集中控制的供应链能够极大的提高供应链利润，因此供应链协调问题研究即具有的理论意义，也具有现实意义。
英文摘要：
This paper focuses on the coordination of a supply chain consisted of one retailer and one supplier, which supplier must expend sales cost, By game theory and the method of comparative static analysis, we derivethe conclusions as follows ： the retailer＇s order quantity increases with the suppfier＇s sales efforts level; the wholesale contract can not coordinate the supply chain. Combinning the wholesale contract and cost - sharing contract the supply chain coordinate. The numerical example show ： the centralized control of the supply chain can greatly increase the supply chain profits, so that the stady on the supply chain coordination has the theoretical significance and the practical significance.
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