中文摘要：

针对R＆D补贴单一内部激励机制的不足，本文通过收集2007--2014年中国1831家上市公司R＆D补贴数据，进行基于PSM匹配的外部激励效应研究。研究发现。在企业普遍存在融资约束的现实背景下，政府R＆D补贴对企业R＆D投入的激励效应高度依赖于“非主动性”的外部融资激励机制：政府R＆D补贴能够释放基于政府信用的技术认证和监管认证双重信用认证信号,使得市场投资者基于对政府评估的信任而给予企业更高的信用认可，这样企业便可获得更多的外部认证性融资。额外的认证融资通过拓宽企业的R＆D融资来源，解决企业R＆D投资面临的融资问题．激励了企业的R＆D投入。本文提出的外部融资激励机制能够解释企业融资不足背景下R＆D补贴的激励效应,弥补R＆D补贴单一内部激励机制的不足，同时对中国政府R＆D补贴的制度创新具有重要参考价值。

英文摘要：

Against the deficiency of the sole internal incentive mechanism of R＆D subsidy, by collected R＆D subsidy statistics of 1831 listed companies in China between 2007--2014, this paper explore the external financing effect of R＆D subsidy based on PSM matching. It is empirically found that under context of frequent financing constraint for firm, incentive effect of governmental R＆D subsidy on firm＇s R＆D investment depends heavily on the ＂non-initiative＂ external financing incentive mechanism： governmental R＆D subsidy conveys signals of double governmental credit certifying based on technological certifying and supervision certifying to external market investors. Keeping high trust on government credit certifying, external market investors allocate firm high credit rating and hence firms obtain more external certifying finance. Additional certifying finance solves firm＇s financing constraints by broadening financing sources to stimulate firm＇s R＆D investment. The finding for external financing incentive mechanism well explains the incentive effect of R＆D subsidy under context of financing constraints for firms in China and compensates the sole internal incentive mechanism. The finding also has important consulting value for institutional innovation of China＇s governmental R＆D subsidy.