实践中,技术拍卖常常采用固定费(英式)拍卖,报价与技术的产出无关.把技术的拍卖价格与其产出联系起来,提出了两部制拍卖机制,即获胜者要支付固定费与提成.首先,作为比较基准,分析了固定费拍卖.其次,分析了独立私有价值情形的最优两部制拍卖机制,每个企业直接报告自己的成本,成本最低的企业赢得拍卖.最优拍卖的固定费与提成由企业报告的成本决定,并且无需设定保留价格.与固定费拍卖相比较,两部制拍卖能够带来更高的期望收益,以及更高的拍卖成交率.
Technology auction in practice often adopts the mode of fixed fee (English) auction, where its price is irrelevant to output. In order to connect technology price with its output, the paper puts forward a two traffic auction mechanism. That is, the winner' s payment consists of a fixed fee and a royalty. At first, English auction is analyzed as a benchmark. Then, an optimal technology auction mechanism of symmetric independent private valueis studied, in which each firm reports its cost. It is found that the winner is the buyer with the lowest cost, fixed fee and royalty of technology price are determined by the firms' reported cost, and a reserve price is not needed. Two-traffic auctions lead to higher expected revenues for the seller, and a higher auction rate.