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中文摘要：
排污权交易作为一项防止和治理环境污染的制度，已在全球范围引起了高度的重视。建立了寡头垄断市场中的排污权交易博弈模型，分析了不同污染治理能力和污染治理成本厂商的纳什均衡及其获得的收益，讨论了古诺无限次重复博弈模型中厂商实现较高效率的均衡条件。
英文摘要：
In the paper, Cournot model has been used to established tradable emission permits game model under the condition of duopoly, so as to analysize the duopoly firms which have different pollution-conrolling capacity and pollution-controlling cost but discharge the same pollutions. Under the condition of controlling the total emission amount, Nash equilibrium can be reached, and the profit of firm gains be analysed. Furthermore, how the higher efficient equilibrium conditions and possibility can be realized in Cournot repeated game model with unlimited times are discussed.
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