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中文摘要：
初始排污权的分配问题不但是组建排污权交易市场的起点扣基础，而且是排污权交易中争议最大扣最困难的问题。目前，初始排污权的分配方式主要有免费分配扣有偿分配两类。根据机制设计原理，建立了交易成本条件下使期望社会福利最大化的初始排污权免费分配模型，并分析了免费分配的决策机制问题。
英文摘要：
Tradable emission permits is an economic instrument used to attain a predetermined level of environmental quality. The basic concept behind emission trading, originated by Dales, is a simple one. Initially, a regulatory agency limits the overall level of emissions, either by setting a standard or allocating emission, and then it allows firms to trade their emission allocations or surplus permits. It is now widely agreed among economists that marketable emission permits can be a cost-effective strategy for controlling environmental pollutants, and an extensive literature on their properties has developed. In this paper, we research the initial emissions permits allocation mechanism in the condition of transaction cost.
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