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中文摘要：
德莱斯基在《意识经验》一文中认为,要探究意识经验的本质和意识自身,就要区分事物性意识和事实性意识,正如我们关于外在的知觉可以分为知觉经验和知觉信念。只有区分了这两种不同的意识,我们才能进一步探究是什么使得经验能够被认知主体意识到。德莱斯基通过考察事物性意识和事实性意识之间的关系,最终论证说我们关于外在事物（或事实）的经验和意识自身能够被我们意识到,不是由于我们对于事物本身的意识,而是这种经验或意识自身作为某种表征在我们的意识过程中所扮演的角色。文章试图对他的这一思想进行分析。
英文摘要：
We have both perceptual experience and perceptual beliefs about the world. Dretske argues in his Conscious Experience, that there is a distinction between the consciousness of things and the consciousness of facts corresponding to perceptual experience and perceptual beliefs, which is significant for capturing the nature of conscious experience and consciousness itself. He makes a clarification as for how these two kinds of consciousness differentiate and relate to each other, and then draws the conclusion that we are conscious of our experience and awareness of things （or facts）, not because of our awareness of things themselves but because of the role the experience or awareness plays in the process of our consciousness as a sort of representation. This paper tries to make an interpretation of Dretske＇s idea.
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