中文摘要：

授权能够有效提升员工绩效和组织利益,但中国企业管理者不授权现象比比皆是。本研究从授权风险的角度探讨管理者不愿授权的原因,并检验领导-成员交换（LMX）和组织集权度的调节作用。通过17家企业收集到的157位管理者与471位下属的配对资料,HLM分析结果显示：任务绩效、组织利益风险考量与管理者授权行为负相关,且这种负向关系还受到LMX的强化;此外,组织集权度在权力地位、组织利益风险考量与授权行为的负向关系中具有显著的调节作用。

英文摘要：

Delegation can effectively improve work performance and organizational interests,but it is still not a common phenomenon that managers willing to delegate.Furthermore,most of the past studies on delegation concentrated on delegation＇s positive outcome;however,little attention was paid to delegation obstacles.The purpose of this study is to explore the no-delegation phenomenon from the supervisor＇s risk considerations for delegation,as well as to probe how Leader-Member Exchange（LMX） and organizational centralization moderate the relationship between delegation risk and delegation behavior based on interactive and structure perspectives.The sample consisted of 157 supervisors and 471 subordinates in 17 enterprises from different industries throughout Mainland China,and supervisors and subordinates were matched in accordance with the ratio of 1：3.HLM method was used for testing hypothesis and results showed that（1） The supervisors delegated less when perceived more delegation risks on task performance and organization benefit.（2） There were significant moderations of LMX on the relationships between supervisor＇s delegation behavior and task performance risk,organizational benefit consideration.When Leader-Member Exchange was high,delegation risk about task performance and organization benefit exerted less negative impact on supervisor＇s delegation behavior.Namely,the impact of delegation risk about task performance and organization benefit was strong in low LMX.（3） Organizational centralization had negative main and moderating effects on delegation behavior significantly.In higher degree of organizational centralization,the delegation risk consideration on power-status and organizational benefit had more strong negative influences on supervisor delegation;on the contrary,delegation risk consideration on power-status and organizational benefit positively or irrelevantly related with delegation behavior in lower organizational centralization.This study contributed to understand the superviso