欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
基于垄断制造商与双寡头零售商所组成的供应链,假设零售商广告促销活动对制造商品牌商誉存在消极影响,运用微分博弈的方法,分别考察了动态架构中的四种博弈情形,两个零售商非联合情况下的Nash非合作博弈和Stackelberg主从博弈,以及两个零售商横向联合情况下的Nash非合作博弈和Stackelberg主从博弈,并对四种博弈情形下的反馈均衡结果进行比较分析。研究发现,制造商的广告投入在四种博弈情形中不变,但是当两个零售商进行联合时,在两种博弈结构下,零售商的广告投入要优于两个零售商非联合的情况。当两个零售商进行联合时,供应链成员的绩效能够实现Pareto改进。
英文摘要：
Based on the supply chain consisting of the monopoly manufacturer and the duopoly retailers,assuming that the retailer＇s avdertisement activity has the negative effect on the manufacturer＇s brand reputation,the differential game was adopted to analyze the manufacturer and the retailers＇optimal advertising strategies in the dynamic structure with the following four game scenarios： Nash game and Stackelberg game with the noncooperative retailers,Nash game and Stackelberg game with the cooperative retailers.Furthermore,the feedback equilibrium outcomes in the four game structures were comparatively analyzed.The results show that the manufacuturer＇s advertising invenstment was the same as each other in the four game structures,but the retailers＇s advertising invenstment was higher in the situation with the non coorperative retailers than that with the cooperative retailers no matter in the Nash game or Stackelberg game.The Pareto improvement for the supply chain members can be obtained when the retailers cooperate with each other.
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
期刊信息
位置：