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中文摘要：
零售商主导型供应链中供应商与零售商的矛盾日益加深,为对该类型供应链作出Pareto改进,研究强势零售商压低供应商批量价格的行为对零售商主导型供应链绩效的影响。首先分别应用经典博弈论和行为博弈论的工具建立完全理性和有限理性背景下供应商和零售商决策的博弈模型,据此将零供双方的交易行为划分为4个不同的演进阶段,最后根据模型的均衡解计算不同演进阶段供应链中各方的绩效,并将结果进行比较。研究结果表明,无论处于交易行为演进的哪个阶段,供应商的绩效都不会优于公平交易下的绩效,零售商和供应链的绩效也不会一直优于公平交易下的绩效。因此,消除零售商对供应商批量价格的打压行为、恢复供应链上下游公平的交易状态是对该类型供应链进行Pareto改进的重要途径之一。
英文摘要：
The contractions between suppliers and retailers in the retailer dominated supply chain are becoming more and more serious. In order to do Pareto improvement for this type of supply chain, this research studies the influence of retailer＇s batch price depression on supply chain＇s performance. Firstly, we establish the decision models of supplier and retailer in traditional game theory under the perfect rationality background and in behavior game theory under bounded rationality background. Then we divide the evolution of transaction behavior of supplier and retailer into four stages. At last, according to the equilibrium solution of the above game model, we calculate and compare the performance of all members of the supply chain at different evolutionary stages. The results show that the performance of supplier in every stage would not be better than that in the fair transaction condi- tion; the performance of retailer and supply chain would not always be better than that in the fair transaction condition. Therefore, it is one of Pareto improvement ways to stop the retailer＇s batch price depression and regain the fair transaction.
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