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中文摘要：
通过分析大型工程主体之间的委托代理关系,研究了有限理性条件下承包商与工程监理合谋的行为机理。引入第三方监管构建合谋治理机制,采用计算实验方法分析了承包商合谋行为在不同治理策略下的演化机理。结果表明,审查机构需通过加大对合谋行为的惩罚力度,以及提升自身审查力度来降低承包商监理的合谋概率。
英文摘要：
By analyzing the principle-agent relationship between the related units during the whole life of the large-scale construction, this paper made research on the collusion behavior mechanism mainly between contractor and supervisor using the game theory. It proposed that the governance mechanism of collusion needs the third regulatory agency. Finally, it used the computational experiment to simulate the governance effect of collusion undertaking the different strategies. The results show that censor organization can effectively reduce the contractor and its supervisor collusion by exaggerating the punishment or increasing its scrutiny.
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