PPP(Public—PrivatePartnership公私伙伴关系)项目融资模式作为一种有效的工程项目建设的融资模式,在我国的应用仍处于相对较新的阶段。针对参与融资的三方之间的两种委托代理关系展开研究,运用博弈论,建立项目发起人和经营者之间的道德风险博弈模型以及项目投资人和经营者之间的逆向选择模型,通过最优化均衡条件,揭示特许经营权协议的经营期限、收费水平、权益比例、项目外部风险大小、资金结构与经营者努力水平等几个变量之间的关系,为制定出合理的特许经营权协议和融资贷款协议提供理论依据,对于实际工作中采用PPP项目融资模式的各参与方也具有积极的参考价值。
PPP ( Public-Private Partnership) project financing mode is a kind of effective construction project financing mode. As a kind of public-private cooperation financing mode, however, the PPP financing mode application is still at a relatively new stage in China, there exist many immature places, including the participantg behavior patterns and principal-agent contract confirmation meth- ods. In this paper, the two kinds of principal-agent relation involved in financing three parties will be investigated, using the game the- ory, the moral risk model between the project sponsor and operator and the adverse selection model between the project investors and the operator is to be proposed respectively. The relationships between several crucial variables of PPP mode are revealed through the optimum equilibrium condition. Our work may provide a theoretical basis for working out the reason franchise agreement and financing loan agreement, and has also a positive reference value for practical PPP project financing.