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中文摘要：
运用演化博弈理论建模与多主体社会仿真实验，分析研究了群体性突发事件中地方政府机会主义行为对事态演变的影响。首先，构建了地方政府部门与社会弱势群体间的演化博弈模型，模型结果表明了地方政府部门机会主义行为将导致群体性突发事件不断扩大的趋势；其次，基于昆明螺蛳湾商户聚集事件事态的演变过程，运用多主体社会仿真方法检验演化博弈理论模型的分析结果，仿真结果较好地验证了理论分析和案例结论。将社会仿真实验方法应用于演化博弈理论分析的研究结论表明，地方政府机会主义行为直接导致了事态扩大趋势，同时也延误了事件处理的最佳时机。
英文摘要：
In this paper, through the comprehensive application of evolutionary game theory modeling and multi-agent social simulation experiments, we study the influence of local government opportunism behaviors in unexpected mass incidents. First, we establish the evolutionary game model between the government and the social vulnerable groups, then the results show that the local government opportunism behaviors lead to an expansive trend of emergency. Second, based on the evolution process of Kunming Luoshi Bay merchants gathered event, we use the multi-agent social simulation test method to test the analysis results of the evolutionary game theory model, and the simulation results verify the conclusions of theoretical analysis well. Therefore, the conclusion of the evolutionary game theory analysis and the social simulation results show that the local governmental opportunism behaviors not only directly lead to the expansion of the situation, but also delay the best time to handle event.
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