我国反恐问题具有长期性特征,以Hausken和Zhuang的动态博弈模型作为阶段博弈,在此基础上构建了政府防御方与恐怖分子的多阶段重复博弈模型。通过数值分析方法,分别讨论了双方对于未来长远收益重视程度、恐怖分子培训与实施袭击成本、政府防御目标估值等因素对于恐怖分子的期望收益和恐怖袭击次数的影响。
Terrorism represented by the "three forces" has become one of the long-term challenges for Chinese society, especially for Xinjiang region. Chinese anti-terrorism combat has the long-term characteristics. Considering the long-term characteristics of anti-terrorism, the paper builds a multi-phase repeated game model between government and terrorists, where Hausken and Zhuang's dynamic game model has been taken as the stage game model. Using numerical experiments, we discussed the influence of the attention for future long-term income, the terrorists' attacking cost, and the government's valuation of the targeted asset on terrorists' expected utility and the number of attacking time.