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中文摘要：
考虑难民跨国流动安置过程中恐怖分子潜入问题,构建了政府防御部门和恐怖分子间的斯塔克伯格博弈模型,结合各个出入境口岸站点侦测概率的相关关系及恐怖分子在站点潜入成本差异,分析了恐怖分子最优潜入站点和政府防御部门安检资源优化配置问题.研究表明,站点潜入成本约束条件下,恐怖分子可供选择的最优潜入站点有所差异;在侦测概率呈现递减情景下,政府防御部门从恐怖分子潜入站点到后续安检站点间配置资源并非是均等的.
英文摘要：
Considering the terrorist＇s infiltration in the process of the refugees＇ transnational flows, a Stackel- berg model between the defender and the terrorist is formulated based on the detection probability correlation among different entry and exit ports and the entry costs of terrorists, and the terrorists＇ optimal infiltration site and the optimal resource allocation of the defender are analyzed. The results show that under the constraints of the terrorists＇ entry costs, the optimal infiltration site is different. When the detection probability has a decreas- ing correlation among different sites, resource allocations from the terrorist＇s infiltration site to subsequent sites are not equal
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